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Limitation of resources has been recently introduced as a mechanism for the survival and coexis-
tence of cooperators with defectors in well-mixed populations. Here we examine the same model on
a scale-free network. A prisoner’s dilemma game on a scale-free network has shown coexistence of
cooperators and defectors for the entire range of parameters. Our results show that by introducing
the network to the limited resources model, the cooperator-dominated region in the parameter space
expands comparing to the results of well-mixed population and the coexistence region becomes nar-
rower. The effect of scale-free network is therefore interpreted as improving the cooperation in the
population and reducing the coexistence.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative behavior is fundamental in evolution of
complex systems from simpler units. The evolution of
multicellular life from eukaryotic cells is an example.
However, understanding the survival of cooperation in a
world that selfish behavior normally provides higher ben-
efits [1–5] remains a challenge that has attracted a lot of
attention during past two decades. For this purpose evo-
lutionary game dynamics [6] has been studied extensively
for simple two-player games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD). In PD every individual selects one of two available
strategies, cooperation or defection. Two cooperators in
a play receive R, while two defectors receive P ; and a
cooperator confronting a defector receives S and the de-
fector in turn receives T , then T > R > P > S. It
is clear that for this game it is better to defect, regard-
less of the opponent’s strategy. According to the rules of
the evolutionary game theory if each strategy is repro-
duced according to its payoff, whenever evolution under
replicator dynamics [7] takes place, we expect that the
population of cooperators asymptotically vanishes in a
well-mixed population (which every pair of individuals
are equally likely to interact).
In order to adopt our model to more realistic situations
in which cooperators survive in the evolutionary process,
different approaches have been proposed. Examples in-
clude departure from the well-mixed population regime
or adoption of other games such as snowdrift game (SG),
which are more favorable to cooperation. In SG the or-
der of P and S is exchanged, such that T > R > S > P .
Thus, contrary to the PD now the best action depends
on the opponent’s strategy. It is better to defect against
a cooperator and cooperate against a defector. Nowak
and May are the pioneers of the scenario for departure
from well-mixed population [8], where they included spa-
tial structure in the PD, such that individuals are allowed
only to interact with their immediate neighbors. Nowak
has also introduced several different mechanisms for the
survival of cooperation [7]. One decade after the work
∗ fazileh@cc.iut.ac.ir
of Nowak and May [8] experiment confirmed that evolu-
tion of cooperation is affected by topological constraints
in a sizable way [9]. However, other studies [10] using
the SG has shown that contrary to PD, cooperation is
inhibited when evolution in the SG is carried out on a
spatial structure, which shows that spatial structure is
not necessarily beneficial for the cooperative behavior.
In a recent work [11] another mechanism, the so-called
limiting of resources, has been introduced as a mecha-
nism for the survival and coexistence of cooperators with
defectors. It was found that the limited resources in ad-
dition to imposing a finite population size, as usually is
assumed in evolutionary game theory [4, 12–16], can also
produce dynamic payoff matrices [11, 17, 18] and switch
the payoff for the interactions between PD and Harmony
Game.
In this article we take another step and study the evo-
lution of the limited resources model in which the payoff
matrix for the interactions can switch between different
games during the evolution of the population on a scale-
free network to examine the effect of a network structure
on the survival of cooperation in this model.
II. THE MODEL
In our model, initially a scale-free network is con-
structed using the following growth and preferential at-
tachment rules, associated with the Barabasi and Albert
(BA) model [19]. We start from a small number of nodes
(m0) and at each time step we add a new node with
m ≤ m0 links from the new node to m different nodes al-
ready present in the network (growth). For choosing the
nodes which the new node connects to, we assume that
the probability pi that a new node will be connected to
node i is pi = ki/
∑
ki, where ki is the degree of node i
(preferential attachment).
In contrast to other studies that a Moran process is
normally applied to a fixed network, in our model the
network is dynamic during the simulation which means
that nodes are added and removed from the network dur-
ing the evolution of the system. This evolution of the net-
work is necessary in modeling the mechanism of limited
resources. When the network is constructed, individuals
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2FIG. 1. This figure shows a simple example of limited resources algorithm on a network. (a)Environment resource influx: The
environment provides resources from the interval [0, 2ET /N ] to two randomly chosen nodes, regardless of their strategy or the
amount of resource they already have. (b) Playing: This step shows two interactions following the rules stated and the payoff
matrix shown in the picture. The dashed-doted line shows an interaction between a cooperator and a defector. According to
the matrix the cooperator looses 3 units of it’s resources and the defector gains a total amount of ∆E. The dashed line also
shows an interaction between a cooperator and a defector. Here the defector has the required resources for entering the game,
but the cooperator does not have any resources left after the play. This means that the defector pays the cost but does not
gain any rewards, so the total payoff for the defector in this game will be -2 reducing it’s resources to zero. (d) Reproduction:
In this step every individual possessing a resource more than Es = 6 will reproduce an individual with the same strategy. The
amount of resources belong to the two of these individuals after one reproduction process will be half of the mother’s resource
before reproduction. In this example reproduction process can occur for a cooperator and the defector. The cooperator has
a resource equal to 11, so only one new player will be added to the network. The defector has resource of 13, so two steps of
reproduction is required.
with two strategies, namely cooperative (C) and defective
(D) are placed randomly on the nodes of this network.
Each individual is given a number indicating its inter-
nal resources. In each time step neighboring individuals
interact and exchange resources with each other accord-
ing to the following rules. The rules are similar to those
introduced in reference [11].
A. Update rules
The updating consists of the following steps:
a. Environment resource influx The environment
provides resources in the average portions of ET /N in
each time step to two randomly selected individuals from
the population independent of their strategy; where ET
is a constant total resource influx and N is the number of
individuals. Specifically, in our simulation the resources
provided by environment is randomly selected from the
interval [0, 2ET /N ] (to prevent sudden explosion of pop-
ulation after Es/(ET /N) time steps, where Es is the pro-
duction threshold and it will be introduced latter).
b. Playing Every two neighboring individuals on the
network interact in each time step. Defectors spend a
cost Ec to enter the game and steal a reward of Er from
the co-player. If a defector’s internal resource is less than
Ec, the player does not pay the cost nor receive the re-
ward. If the defector’s co-player has resources less than
the reward, the entire amount of co-player’s internal re-
sources will transfer to the defector. So the pay-off ma-
3trix for the interaction is:
C D
C
D
 0 −Er
∆E −Ec
 (1)
where ∆E = Er−Ec > 0 is the net reward for defectors in
interactions with cooperators (payoffs for the row player).
So, as long as the C player internal resources are more
than Er, the interaction equals a simplified PD game.
c. Reproduction In each time step individuals who
have internal resources more than a threshold value, Es,
will reproduce an individual with the same strategy and
half of their internal resources will transfer to the new
born individual. The new born individual is connected
to her mother and m− 1 randomly selected other nodes
with a probability proportional to the degree of the nodes
(degree of a node is the number of links connected to that
node).
d. Death In each time step two individuals are se-
lected randomly and are removed from the network with
a small probability of f .
The above rules are summarised in Fig. 1.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
In order to simulate the evolution of the system we
start with a population of N players with ρ indicating
the fraction of cooperators or C players. According to
the model introduced in ref. [11], and since the number
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FIG. 2. Fraction of cooperators, ρC , versus time for a pop-
ulation on an all-to-all network interacting through limited
resources model. In this graph the reproduction threshold is
1000, initial population is 100, environment resource influx is
20000, death frequency is 0.01, the cost paid by defectors or
EC is 400, ∆E = 200, and the initial fraction of cooperators
is 0.5. Here we have recorded the results once after 70 time
steps.
of interactions in each time step is supposed to be propor-
tional to the number of individuals, it was assumed that
there are N/2 interactions in each time step. Each inter-
action consists of four processes with the following order.
First, two random individuals are selected for consuming
environment resource influx, then two nearest neighbor
individuals are selected randomly for a play, then repro-
duction and death processes are taking place as required.
The evolution of the population and its network is contin-
ued until a stable population with reasonable fluctuations
is reached (in our calculations that starts with a popula-
tion of 100 individuals, total environment resource influx
of 20000, death rate of 0.01, and reproduction threshold
of 1000, this condition is normally reached after around
2000 time steps). In order to compare our model with
similar calculations from other authors, we establish an
all-to-all network where each player is connected to all
other existing players with a probability of one. Inter-
actions on this network is expected to be identical with
interactions in a well-mixed population. This means that
for specific parameter values we expect to have coexis-
tence of C and D players in a final meta-stable state [11].
When all parameters are fixed, increasing ∆E will de-
crease the final value of ρC . These results are consistent
with the data shown in Fig. 2 of ref. [11].
Summary of our results are shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3.
These figures show the results of our program for an all-
to-all network. The results are persuasively in agreement
with Requejo et. al. [11].
It is shown that the limited resources model on a well-
mixed population provides different regions of coexis-
tence for different values of parameters. In fact, provided
the meta-stable state is reached and the only variable is
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FIG. 3. Final fraction of cooperators, ρC , after playing
in a well-mixed population as a function of the cost paid by
defectors, EC , for two values of ∆E = 10 and ∆E = 200
. In both graphs the reproduction threshold is 1000, initial
population is 100, environment resource influx is 20000 and
the initial fraction of cooperators is 0.5.
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FIG. 4. The main graph shows fraction of cooperators, ρC ,
versus time for playing on a scale-free graph. Inset shows
the population of cooperators(line), defectors(dashed-plus),
and the total population(dashed line) versus time. Here the
reproduction threshold is 1000, initial population is 100, en-
vironment resource influx is 20000, death frequency is 0.01,
the cost paid by defectors or EC is 400 ,the initial fraction
of cooperators is 0.5 and ∆E = 200. Here we recorded the
results once after 70 time steps.
∆E, it is shown in Fig. 3 that by decreasing ∆E this
region shrink, and it is shifted toward the smaller values
of Ec, in agreement with ref. [11].
To simulate limited resources on a scale-free network,
we need to consider the dynamic features of the model.
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FIG. 5. Final fraction of cooperators, ρC , as a function of EC
for playing on a scale-free network and in a well-mixed pop-
ulation. In these graphs the reproduction threshold is 1000,
initial population is 100, environment resource influx is 20000,
death frequency is 0.01, the initial fraction of cooperators is
0.5 and ∆E = 200. Results are averaged over 10 independent
runs of the program.
That means, reproduction of a new player adds a new
node to the network. This node is connected to m ex-
isting nodes or players. Death also removes a node and
all its connections from the network. Considering these
points and using the method described above, we ob-
served that by adding such a dynamic network to our
model, meta-stable states are reached sooner; that is,
with identical parameter values meta-stable states of lim-
ited resource model on a scale-free network results with
less time steps in comparison with well-mixed population.
The described results are shown in Fig. 4.
Another observation is related to the parameter values
that allow coexistence in meta-stable states. Considering
identical parameter values, we can see that playing on a
scale-free network causes the population to establish co-
operation at lower values of EC as is shown in Fig. 5. Also
we can see that the region of coexistence shrinks when we
add the scale-free network to the model. In other words
limited resources on a scale-free network helps coopera-
tion to establish and dominate faster.
IV. DISCUSSION
To summarise the results we should mention that lim-
ited resources helps cooperation to stay in the popula-
tion. The final fraction of cooperators depends on the
parameter values. Environment resources effectively con-
trols the reproduction rate. The effective rate of death is
controlled by death frequency. In a well-mixed popula-
tion any two individuals can be the players of the game;
however, it seems more logical if individuals that are re-
lated in some way be allowed to play with each other.
Limited resources model is associated with a dynamic
population. To ease the simulation of this feature and
in order to choose a network that describes many natu-
ral phenomena, a scale-free network has been chosen and
added to the limited resources model.
Generally a network helps cooperation to evolve and
stay in the population. This feature has been tested with
different mechanisms. In fact a network causes coop-
erators to reach a kind of advantage by gathering and
forming clusters [7, 20]. In a scale-free network, coop-
erators occupying hobs are able to promote cooperation
by making clusters of cooperators around hobs [20]. In
such a situation, neighbors are mainly relatives. In this
model relatives which have the same strategies are pro-
duced and connected to each other through the reproduc-
tion process. Also, as the time passes, new individuals
are replaced in the population. This means cooperators
placed on hobs can effectively interact with their rela-
tives. These cooperators may interact with defectors too,
but the passage of time guarantees that cooperators can
achieve a kind of advantage associated with the resources,
because eventually the average resources of the defectors
decreases, which causes the number of defectors allowed
to play decrease too.
Simulations show that limited resources algorithm
5combined with scale-free network is beneficial for evo-
lution of cooperation. In fact comparing a well-mixed
population interacting through limited resources algo-
rithm with a population on a scale-free network inter-
acting through the same algorithm shows an increase in
the final frequency of cooperators. Fig. 5 shows that
cooperation starts to resist defection, and also stay in
the population at lower values of EC . Also the meta-
stable state region shrinks by introducing the network to
the population. At the end we may notice that know-
ing the exact mechanism of evolving cooperation in this
model needs further studies. To find clusters of coopera-
tors, the network should be explored. Also, it should be
mentioned that the above mentioned network remains a
scale-free network during the evolution.
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